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Politicians and businessmen use various strategies to outwit their 
opponents. One such strategy is crowd renting, a powerful virtual strategy. A 
mathematical model developed by Nwobi-Okoye using game theory is used 
to show that crowd renting would always be the equilibrium strategy in 
strategic interactions involving political actors and businesses, provided the 
cost of using such strategies does not exceed a certain critical threshold 
where using it would no longer be the equilibrium strategy. It is equally 
shown that crowd renting would improve the electoral/business fortunes of 
parties/candidates/businesses and queuing system performance by 
increasing the number of possible voters or customers as the case may be. 
Finally it is shown mathematically that delaying voting in opposition 
strongholds or delaying the start of business by an opponent makes the 
opposition or opponent less likely to win. 
 




In a previous work of the author where the concept of virtual reality 
in game theory was introduced, It was noted that crowd renting, an 
important strategy in politics and business, could be regarded as a 
virtual strategy (Nwobi-Okoye, 2009). Political actors and 
businessmen have used such strategies over the years with good 
measure of success to out maneuver their opponents. 
Exploiting the crowd effect has been one of the tools in the arsenal 
of political actors over the years. The late Nigerian military head of 
state, General Sani Abacha, used it in his famous 2 million man 
match held in the Nigerian capital, Abuja in the year 1998. The 
match was organized at the height of his struggle to succeed 
himself as the civilian Head of State. Insiders knew the crowd used 
during the match was actually rented to give the impression that 
Nigerians were solidly in support of his plan to transmute into a 
civilian leader which his administration was then organizing. In 
Nigeria, crowd renting has been an accepted part of the 
electioneering process for a very long time, and rented crowds at 
political rallies is not uncommon. 
In most countries in Africa, crowd renting tactics by unpopular 
leaders desperate to hang on to power abound (Muchemwa, 2010), 
(Okumu, 2010). Quite often, such tactics worked well for such 
leaders, as in the case of Zimbabwe where President Robert 
Mugabe used it effectively to out maneuver his opponents. 
 
Another facet of crowd renting is widely used in commercial motor 
parks in Nigeria where passengers board vehicles to their various 
destinations. In this situation, dummy passengers are used in 
commercial vehicles to induce passengers to board them. This has 
been used with great success for many years in Nigerian motor 
parks. Some business organizations like banks adopt this strategy 
where the actual number of persons in a queue is deliberately 
hidden to induce more persons to join the queue.  
 
In the light of the above, crowd renting was studied scientifically in 
order to understand better the mechanisms of its occurrence so that 
political actors and business strategists can use it more effectively. 
One possible salient scientific method of studying crowd renting is 
through the application of game theoretic modeling to understand 
the scientific basis to crowd renting successes. 
 
 
This paper presents the results of applying game theoretic model 
developed by Nwobi-Okoye (2009) to analyze crowd renting. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Crowd Renting and Virtual Reality: A crowd is a large and 
definable group of people. A crowd may be definable through a 
common purpose or set of emotions, such as at a political rally, at a 
sports event, or simply be made up of many people going about 
their business in a busy area (e. g. shopping). Crowd psychology is 
a branch of social psychology. The psychological aspects of crowd 
are concerned with the psychology of the crowd as a group and the 
psychology of those who allow their will and emotions to be 
informed by the crowd. Ordinary people can typically gain direct 
power by acting collectively. Historically, because large groups of 
people have been able to bring about dramatic and sudden social 
change in a manner that bypasses established due process, they 
have also provoked controversy (Wikipedia, 2010).  
 
Social scientists have developed several different theories for 
explaining crowd psychology, and the ways in which 
the psychology of the crowd differs significantly from the psychology 
of those individuals within it (Wikipedia, 2010). One notable theorist 
on crowd psychology is Sigmund Freud. The main idea of Sigmund 
Freud’s crowd behaviour theory is that people who are in a crowd 
act differently towards people from those who are thinking 
individually. In other words, opinions of individuals in a crowd are 
the crowd’s opinion.  The minds of the group would merge to form a 
way of thinking. Each member’s enthusiasm would be increased as 
a result, and one becomes less aware of the true nature of one’s 
actions (Jones, 1958; Tauber, 2010). The corner stone of this paper 
is based on Freud’s theory of crowd. 
 
Virtual reality occurs when the payoff determining factors assume 
certain conditions exist which in fact do not. Virtual reality strategies 
use deceptive perceptions used to improve payoffs for the strategist 
(Nwobi-Okoye, 2009). 
 
When the crowd in a political rally is rented, intending voters 
apparently unaware of this have a tendency to follow the crowd. 
Similarly, if the crowd in the commercial vehicle being loaded is 
rented, intending passengers apparently unaware of this tends to 
join the vehicle since they assume the vehicle is about to be full to 
commence the journey. This is virtual reality because in the first 
example, the crowd does not support the given political party; it is 
just the voter’s perception. Parties/candidates that have rented 
crowd are thus more likely to attract more voters than 
parties/candidates that have not rented their crowd. 
 
THE MODEL 
The game theoretic model used to model crowd renting is the 
Markov queue game model (Nwobi-Okoye, 2009). The following 
assumptions were made for the purpose of the modeling: 
 
Game Characteristics and Assumptions:The mathematical model 
for analyzing crowd renting was developed based on the following 
game characteristics and assumptions: 
 
1. The game corresponds to the game developed by Nwobi-
Okoye (2009). 
2. An infinite population source which represents possible 
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3. Crowd renting increases the probability of a voter/customer 
queuing behind a particular candidate or business. 
4. Crowd renting improves the overall performance of the 
queuing system in terms of the number served. 
 
Mathematical Analysis: The mathematical analysis is based on the 
assumption that two candidates in an election try to out-campaign 
each other by using crowd renting as a campaign strategy, or that 
two businesses try to make more gains and out perform each other 
by adopting crowd renting strategies. Each voter/customer could 
queue behind (vote for or patronize) any of the 
candidates/businesses he/she prefers. The entire mathematical 
analysis is based on the model developed by Nwobi-Okoye (2009). 
The applicable equations for modeling the game theoretic aspect of 
crowd renting are: 
 
.......(1)........................................  GPEG   
 
The dot operator in equation 1 carries out the operation of 
multiplying each payoff by its associated probability of occurrence.  
 





For variant 2 games, equations 2, 3 and 4 are of the form shown in 
equations 5, 6 and 7: 
 
......(5)........................................  RGGT   
 
Here, R is the payoff reduction. 
 




















For variant 1 and 2 games, if crowd renting/hiding is used by any of 
the players, equation 1 changes to:  
 
..(8)........................................  GTPTEG   
 
The grand payoff matrix, GG, is shown in Fig. 1. 
 




















FIG. 1. GRAND PAYOFF MATRIX, GG 
 
Here  
GGiX,jX = the cumulative payoff for player X in the effective payoff matrix, EG, when X uses strategy i-1. GGiY,jY = the cumulative payoff for 























(10) ...............  
 
N= maximum value of strategies i. e. possible number of crowd renting strategies. 
 
APPLICATION CASE STUDIES 
Definitions: The appropriate class of virtual games to be used for the modeling as I have said earlier is the Markov Queue Game. In this 
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             FIG 2. TRANSITION MATRIX FOR EACH COMPETITOR 
 
Assuming two competitors are denoted by X and Y, the unified transition matrix PU obtained by combining the transition matrices of players 
X and Y denoted by Px and Py respectively is shown in fig. 3 below: 
 
                             0                      1                      …   N 
 
0        P1X,1X , P1Y,1Y    P1X,2X , P1Y,2Y  … P1X,NX,P1Y,NY                                 
                  
1        P2X,1X , P2Y,1Y    P2X,2X , P2Y,2Y  … P2X,NX,P2Y,NY   
 . .  .  . 
 .  .  .  . 
 . .  .  .                                                                                                                                                
 N       PNX,NX ,PNY,1Y   PNX,2X , PNY,2Y  … PNX,NX,PNY,NY 
    
 
            
              FIG. 3. UNIFIED TRANSITION MATRIX, PU 
 
Let the gain per voter be estimated with the formula: 
 
                                                                                                      
Where 
 
GPV=Gain per voter 
N=number of possible voters 
GT=Total possible Gain 
 
The cost of crowd renting per voter could be estimated with the formula: 
                                                                                                        
Where 
 
CPV=Cost per voter 
N=number of possible voters 
C= cost of crowd renting 
 
Observation 1: If the utility functions for two players X and Y which are denoted by f(n) and g(n) respectively are functions of n where n is the 
number of voters, if f(n)>g(n) and CPV remain constant, it follows that at equilibrium,  
 
IYIYGGIXJXGG  . Provided the game is not biased in favour of any player. 
 
Proof: Let GPVx denote gain per voter for player X and GPVy the gain per voter for player Y. 
 
                                              … (11)  
                                                                  … (12)  
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 , it follows that at equilibrium IYIYGGIXJXGG   provided the game is not biased in favour of any 
player. 
        
Proposition 1: Let 
nJXnIX
GG represent elements of competitor X of the matrix GG at period n and
11  nJXnIX

















GG  provided the equilibrium of the transition matrix P is reached at period n. 
 







P nii  
 
Therefore, each state is transient except N. Since state N is the absorbing state and transition matrix P is reducible; hence, at equilibrium the 
probability of staying at state N is one, while the probability of staying in any other state is zero. From equation 1 EG = P∙G and from equation 










































GG .  
     
Proposition 2: For a given payoff reduction factor z, if strategy n is optimal i. e. an equilibrium at period n, it may not necessarily be optimal at 
period n+1 provided the equilibrium state of the transition matrix P is not reached at period n and the game is not biased in favour of any 
player. 
 
Corollary: For a given payoff reduction factor z, if strategy n is optimal i.e. an equilibrium at period n, it is also optimal at period n+1 provided 
the equilibrium state of the transition matrix P is reached at period n and the game is not biased in favour of any player. 
 




 represent the gain for competitor X 






 represent the gain for competitor X while playing the optimal strategy n at period n+1  







GG , it follows that for a given payoff reduction factor z, if strategy n is optimal i. e. an  equilibrium at  
 
period n, it is also optimal at period n+1 provided the equilibrium state of the transition matrix P is reached at period n and the game is not 
biased in favour of any player. 
 
Proposition3: For variant 1 games, if strategy n1 is used by player X and n2 is used by player Y. If n1>n2, the transition matrix for player X 
reaches equilibrium before that for player Y and if 
kJXkIX
GG represent elements of competitor X of the matrix GG at period k 
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and
kJYkIY




GG   provided the equilibrium of the transition matrix 
P is not reached at period n. 
 
 
Proof: In matrix PU above if strategy n1 is used by player X and n2 is used by player Y, since n1>n2 virtual strategy is used by player X, 
hence IYJYPIXJXP   where i=0 and j<n and IYJYPIXJXP   where i=0 or j>n. It can comfortably be assumed that all other 
elements of the matrix PU remain the same. But from proposition 1 it is shown that each state of the Transition Matrix P is transient except N, 
and state N is the absorbing state. Since transition matrix P is reducible, it follows that if the transition matrix for player X, Px reaches 
equilibrium at period m1 and the transition matrix for player Y, Py reaches equilibrium at m2 that m1>m2.  
 





















































GG   provided the game is not 
biased in favour of any player. 
 
 
CASE 1: VOTING 
The mathematical model used in this case corresponds to variant 1 games as mentioned above. Here it is assumed that political parties or 
candidates for an election use crowd renting as campaign strategy during an election. 
 
The voting is assumed to be electronic voting and the queuing system for the voting system could be represented by Fig. 4. 
 
  
          
 
 








Qa= voter for party/candidate a 
Qb= voter for party/candidate b 
 
The servers in Fig. 4 are assumed to have a finite capacity of two. The voting which is electronic voting, is assumed to take place in batches of 
two, hence a maximum of two voters can cast their votes simultaneously with the electronic system. Voters use different machines depending 
on the candidate/party they wish to vote for. 
 
Problem Statement: Let us assume that proportional representation is used in an election and that the gain made from each vote is 20 units. 
Assuming that employing crowd renting strategies takes away either 1unit or 5 units from the gain which reduces the gain to 19 units or 15 
units. If we assume an infinite population source and equally assume that the voting is done in batches of two voters per batch.  
 
How could game theoretic modeling be used to determine the equilibrium point assuming two parties/candidates campaign for an election and 
could either use crowd renting or not? 
 
This problem could be solved by assuming a 2 strategy, 2-persons Markov queue game which will be evaluated shortly. 
 
Evaluation of the 2 Strategy, 2-Persons Game: Typical transition matrices for the two candidates/parties are as follows: 
 
SOURCE 
SERVER 1 SERVER 2 
Qa Qb 
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2          1        0                                       









2          1        0                                      




For the above transition matrices, we assumed that the probability of moving from a higher state to a lower state is zero (0). 
 
If the game is biased in favour of X, Px looks like this: 





2          1        0                                         




The matrix could be biased in favour of a particular candidate/party for some reasons namely: 
 
 The candidate/party is favoured by the majority ethnic group, religious denomination, age group etc. 
 The party/candidate has more resources at his/her disposal. 
 
A unified transition matrix, P, of the game produced by combining Px and Py is shown below: 
 





0 P  
 
A typical payoff matrix G0 for the game is shown below: 
 




0 G  
 
The effective payoff matrix for the game, EG0, is given by: EG0 = G0 ∙ P0 
 




0 EG  
 
Possible total payoff for player X = 32.0 
Possible total payoff for player Y = 32.0 
 
The transition and payoff matrices above represent the natural state of the game. 
Since crowd renting is virtual reality, introducing it as a strategy would, as expected, improve the payoff of the competitors using the strategy 
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(Nwobi-Okoye, 2009). Hence, a unified transition matrix of the game produced by combining matrix Px and Py is assumed to change to PT as 
shown below, in accordance with virtual strategy theorem (Nwobi-Okoye, 2010). 
 







For the payoff matrix G0 above, if strategy 1 which is virtual strategy is used and R= 1.0, we have from equation 2: 
 














The effective payoff matrix, EG1, is given by: EG = GT ∙ PT 
  




1 EG  
Total payoff for player X = 37.7 
Total payoff for player Y = 37.7 
 
The grand payoff matrix, GG for R = 1.0 is given by: 






A look at the payoff matrix, GG, above shows that nash equilibrium point corresponds to strategy 1, 1. 
 
For the payoff matrix G0 above, if strategy 1 which is virtual strategy is used and R= 5.0, we have from equation 2: 
 














The effective payoff matrix, EG1, is given by: EG1 = GT ∙ PT 
  




1 EG  
 
Total payoff for player X = 37.7 
Total payoff for player Y = 37.7 
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The grand payoff matrix, GG for R = 5.0 is given by: 






A look at the payoff matrix, GG, above shows that nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) point corresponds to strategy 0, 0. 
 
CASE 2: BUSINESS PATRONAGE: In previous mathematical analysis (Nwobi-Okoye, 2009), variant 1 model was used in input based crowd 
renting system. A practical example was the system earlier mentioned where dummy passengers are used in commercial vehicles to induce 
passengers to board them, or in situations where the actual number of persons in a queue are hidden from would be customers. 
 
The queuing model in this case is similar to that of variant 1 as shown in Fig. 4. But in this case: 
Qa= Customer for business a 
Qb= Customer for business b 
 
The servers in Fig. 4 are assumed to have a finite capacity. The service is assumed to take place simultaneously in batches; hence, if the 
server capacity N is two, a maximum of two customers can be served simultaneously by the server. Customers queue behind each 
business/player depending on their preferences. This scenario is similar to what happens in motor parks in Nigeria, where the commercial 
vehicles have a finite capacity which represents the number of passengers it could accommodate. The customers are served simultaneously 
because the passengers leave the park simultaneously when the vehicle is full. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
From the evaluation above it could be deduced that the application of virtual strategies (crowd renting) increase the possibility of either 
party/candidate gaining a vote. But application of virtual strategy comes at a price, hence at a certain cost the virtual strategy becomes optimal 
for either player. But as the cost increases, non virtual strategy becomes optimal. Hence, there must always be a complete economic analysis 
before applying virtual strategies in Markov Queue Games. The overall effect of crowd renting is that it could improve the electoral fortunes of 
the parties or candidates. This could be explained from the fact the voter population is assumed to be infinite and crowd renting has the 
tendency to get more voters out to vote. This phenomenon is similar to advertising which could make more buyers to buy competing products, 
thereby improving the fortunes of the competing firms. 
 
The consequence of proposition 2 is that if voting in an opponent’s stronghold is delayed or if an opponent starts the game later, the chance of 
the opponent winning is reduced. This explains the basis for the strategy sometimes used by ruling parties which deliberately delays voting in 
opposition strongholds by delaying the delivery of electoral materials to the strongholds. Of course the period for voting is finite and when 
voting ends, the game is up. 
 
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 apply to all facets of crowd renting or hiding, whether input based on non input based. Hence, crowd renting/hiding 
generally improves the performance of a queuing system. Secondly, a competitor that adopts crowd renting/hiding strategy is more likely to 
win. Thirdly, a player that starts the game earlier than his opponent is more likely to win, a direct consequence of proposition 2. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Crowd renting alters the perception of would be customers/voters and improves their possibility of joining the crowd. This is a powerful virtual 
strategy which should be exploited to the maximum by businessmen, politicians and political actors. The mathematical/analytical basis for its 
successful exploitation has been laid down in this work.  
 
The analysis done in this work will be very useful to game theorists, political scientists, systems scientists and operations researchers who 
advise businesses, politicians and political actors. 
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